Executive summary
A great deal of the practical outcome of commercial litigation can be determined in its first few weeks. An order freezing a defendant’s assets, preserving a disputed fund or requiring a bank to disclose where money has gone can matter more to the eventual outcome than anything that happens at trial, and it is often the order that brings the other side to the table. Part 25 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) gives the Court a broad range of such interim remedies, from the familiar interim injunction and freezing order to powers that English practitioners may not expect to find, including an order for an individual to surrender their passport.
Applications are ordinarily made on notice to the other side, although the Court will hear an application without notice where there is good reason, most often because warning the respondent would defeat the purpose of the order. An applicant who takes that route assumes a demanding duty of full and frank disclosure, and the DIFC Courts have shown themselves willing to discharge orders obtained in breach of it.
An applicant for an injunction must ordinarily undertake to compensate the respondent if the order proves to have been wrongly granted, and one without sufficient assets within the jurisdiction, typically a foreign company, may be required to back that undertaking with a bank guarantee or cash. Defendants have a parallel protection in security for costs, which the Court may order against a claimant resident outside the UAE, or one that otherwise presents a real risk that an adverse costs order would go unpaid.
Since the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Carmon and Trafigura, and the enactment of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025, the DIFC Courts have also become a significant forum for interim relief in support of litigation and arbitration elsewhere.
A Long List with Three Broad Purposes
RDC 25.1 lists eighteen kinds of interim remedy. Most applications in practice serve one of three purposes: keeping matters as they are until the dispute is decided, protecting assets against which a judgment may later be enforced, and obtaining information the applicant cannot otherwise get. The rest of the list is more specialised, covering such matters as the inspection and sampling of property, the sale of perishable goods, the payment of a disputed fund into Court and the appointment of receivers, and it ends with “any other remedy provided by any other law”, which leaves the categories open.
Three features of the framework are worth having in mind from the outset. The Court may grant an interim remedy whether or not the applicant seeks a final remedy of that kind (RDC 25.3), which is what allows a freezing order to sit alongside an ordinary claim for damages. It may do so at any time, including before proceedings are issued and after judgment (RDC 25.6), although relief before a claim is made requires urgency or some other reason grounded in the interests of justice (RDC 25.7(2)), and the applicant will usually have to undertake to issue a claim form promptly (RDC 25.14). And while the Registrar deals with a good deal of interlocutory business, freezing orders, search orders and the disclosure orders that accompany them may only be made by a Judge (RDC 3.3). The Registrar may grant an injunction in an emergency when no Judge is available, but only to the extent necessary to preserve the status quo until one can be found (RDC 3.6).
At the other end of the timeline, an interim remedy expressed to last until judgment or further order expires when final judgment is delivered, and a party who needs it to continue, for instance until the judgment has been paid, must apply for that specifically (RDC 25.32). The point is easily overlooked in the aftermath of a successful trial, which is precisely when a judgment debtor has most reason to move assets.
Holding the Ring: Interim Injunctions
The interim injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is the general-purpose remedy. It is used to restrain the sale of a disputed asset, to prevent the misuse of confidential information, to keep a share register or the composition of a board as it stands, or to stop a party acting on a disputed termination. The DIFC Courts apply the approach familiar from American Cyanamid. In Larmag Holding BV v First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC, Justice Sir Richard Field continued a proprietary injunction over corporate bonds, originally granted on a Part 8 application before any claim had been issued, on the basis that there was a serious issue to be tried, that the balance of convenience favoured the injunction and that it was just and convenient to grant it.1
In most cases the decisive question is whether damages would be an adequate remedy. If an award of damages at trial would properly compensate the applicant, and the respondent would be good for the money, there will rarely be a case for restraining the respondent in the meantime. In Larmag, damages were inadequate because there was a real risk that any award against the alleged fraudsters would not be honoured, given the uncertainty over the whereabouts of one and the existence of the other, and because the applicant, as parent of the issuer, had good reason not to want fraudulently obtained bonds sold on the secondary market. The judge also looked at the other side of the scale, finding that the applicant’s undertaking in damages, fortified by a payment into Court, would adequately protect the respondents if the injunction turned out to have been wrongly granted. Doubt over the other side’s ability to pay, and an asset that cannot readily be recovered once it has gone, are features common to many successful applications.
Freezing Orders
The freezing order is usually the remedy a client has in mind when asking what can be done immediately. RDC 25.1(6) allows the Court to restrain a party from removing assets from the jurisdiction, or from dealing with assets wherever they are located. Its purpose is narrower than clients sometimes assume, since a freezing order gives the applicant no security over the assets and no priority over other creditors; it prevents the respondent from putting itself beyond the reach of a judgment by disposing of assets otherwise than in the ordinary course.
The requirements were set out by the Court of Appeal in 2008 in Ithmar Capital v 8 Investment, the first appeal ever to come before it, and they remain the starting point. The applicant must show a good arguable case; that the respondent has or may have assets available to satisfy a judgment; a real risk that the judgment will go unsatisfied because of an unjustifiable disposal of those assets; and that it is just and convenient in all the circumstances to make the order.2 The Court in Ithmar added that the risk of dissipation must be established by solid evidence. A respondent’s wealth, its residence abroad or its general unattractiveness will not suffice without something to suggest that assets are likely to be moved, and applicants usually build their case from the respondent’s past dealings with its assets, its corporate structure and its record of complying with its obligations. In Trafigura v Gupta, considering whether the first defendant’s wife held assets on his behalf under the Chabra jurisdiction, which reaches assets held by a third party against whom no claim is made, Justice Robert French put the point directly: “Suspicion supported by speculation does not make the arguable case required to support the making of a Chabra Order.”3
Freezing Orders in Support of Proceedings Elsewhere
Until recently, the availability of a freezing order in the DIFC Courts in support of foreign proceedings was in real doubt. In Sandra Holding v Al Saleh, in September 2023, the Court of Appeal set aside a worldwide freezing order granted in support of proceedings in Kuwait, holding that there was no jurisdiction to grant one in anticipation of a foreign judgment that had not yet been given. Fourteen months later, in Carmon Reestrutura v Cuenda, a differently constituted Court of Appeal concluded that Sandra Holding had taken a wrong turning. The Court’s jurisdiction to recognise and enforce foreign judgments carries with it the power to prevent that jurisdiction being thwarted, and a defendant who empties its accounts before the foreign judgment arrives thwarts it as effectively as one who does so afterwards.4
Article 15(4) of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025 now expressly confers jurisdiction over applications for interim or precautionary measures related to “applications, claims, or current or future arbitral proceedings brought outside the DIFC seeking suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC”. In Trafigura, the Court of Appeal held that the provision encompasses freezing orders in aid of foreign proceedings capable of producing a judgment enforceable in the DIFC, together with orders for the disclosure of assets and related information, and continued a freezing order over the UAE assets of a defendant living in onshore Dubai, up to USD 625 million, in support of fraud proceedings in England.5 The case also shows how quickly the Court can act. The claim was issued on 11 April 2025 and the application refused at first instance six days later on jurisdictional grounds; the Court of Appeal granted the freezing order itself, without notice, on 26 April 2025 and decided the jurisdictional question after a full hearing later that year.
In Omanand v Ondrei, a Hong Kong company obtained a freezing order without notice in December 2025 in support of the enforcement of a Russian arbitral award for around USD 628 million. Rejecting the argument that Article 15(4) ceased to apply once the award had been made, Justice Roger Stewart held that the words “current or future” are expansive and do not confine the jurisdiction to arbitrations still in progress.6 Where there is no substantive claim before the DIFC Courts, these applications are brought under Part 8 (RDC 25.24), the procedure considered in Part III of this series.
Finding the Assets: Information Orders
A freezing order is of limited use if the applicant does not know where the assets are. RDC 25.1(7) allows the Court to order a party to provide information about the location of relevant property or assets, and such orders routinely accompany freezing orders. Where a respondent’s disclosure is inadequate, the Court may order that it be cross-examined on it, and the cross-examination may take place before the Registrar (RDC 3.4).
Information may also be obtained before proceedings begin, or from someone who is not a party. RDC 25.1(9) and (10) permit orders for the production of documents or the inspection of property before a claim is made and against non-parties, provided the evidence shows that the material is or may become the subject of the proceedings, or is relevant to the issues in them (RDC 25.71). Pre-action applications of this kind are again made under Part 8 (RDC 25.24(2)). The Court will also grant Norwich Pharmacal relief against a third party that has become mixed up, however innocently, in another’s wrongdoing. In Skatteforvaltningen v FFA Private Bank (Dubai) Ltd, part of the Danish tax authority’s litigation in several jurisdictions over what it alleges was a massive fraud against it, Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke ordered a DIFC bank to produce documents identifying the recipients of certain transfers and their onward dealings, holding that the Court’s statutory powers were wide enough for the purpose and that the information could not realistically be obtained by other means.7 The applicant was required to pay the bank’s reasonable costs of complying, which is the usual price of an order of this kind.
The Less Familiar Remedies
The interim payment, which requires a defendant to pay on account of damages or a debt before trial, receives less attention than it deserves. Broadly, it is available only where liability has been admitted, where judgment has been entered with damages to be assessed, or where the Court is satisfied that the claimant would obtain judgment for a substantial sum at trial (RDC 25.81), and the Court may not order more than a reasonable proportion of the likely final judgment (RDC 25.82). The application cannot be made until the time for acknowledging service has expired (RDC 25.73), and the fact of an interim payment is kept from the trial judge (RDC 25.96). For a claimant whose case on liability is strong but whose losses will take time to quantify, it can provide both cash flow and a good deal of settlement pressure.
The Court may also order that a disputed fund be paid into Court or otherwise secured (RDC 25.1(12)), direct the delivery up of goods (RDC 25.1(5)) and appoint a receiver over the property of a company or an individual (RDC 25.1(16) and (17)(a)). Most strikingly, where the respondent is an individual, the Court may order him to deliver up his passport, or prohibit him from leaving the DIFC, Dubai or the UAE without the Court’s consent (RDC 25.1(17)(b) and (c)). In England such orders are made exceptionally, as ancillary relief in support of a freezing order; in the DIFC they appear on the face of the Rules. They nonetheless remain a serious interference with personal liberty, and an applicant should expect to have to justify one by reference to the other orders it is intended to make effective.
With Notice or Without
The general rule is that an application notice must be served on each respondent (RDC 23.4). For an interim remedy, the notice and the evidence in support must be served as soon as practicable and in any event at least three days before the hearing (RDC 25.17). Applications are classed as ordinary or heavy according to whether the hearing will take more or less than two hours, with a longer timetable for evidence in heavy applications (RDC 23.39 to 23.47).
An application may be made without notice only with the Court’s permission, which will be given in limited circumstances, including exceptional urgency and where there are good reasons for proceeding without notice, for example because notice “would or might defeat the object of the application” (RDC 23.6). The evidence must explain why notice has not been given (RDC 25.10 and 25.23). In the case of a freezing order the reason is usually obvious, since a respondent warned that its accounts are about to be frozen has every opportunity to empty them first. Where secrecy is not essential, the applicant should still notify the respondent informally, even if formal notice is impossible (RDC 23.7 and 25.13(3)), and any application for an interim injunction requires an oral hearing (RDC 23.9).
The Duty of Full and Frank Disclosure
An applicant who is heard in the respondent’s absence must be scrupulously candid. The applicant and its lawyers must disclose all matters relevant to the application, including in particular any defences that may be available to the respondent (RDC 23.11). The Court must be able to rely on the applicant to present the case fairly, which means putting forward the points the absent respondent would make, so far as they can reasonably be anticipated. The duty extends to facts the applicant would have discovered on reasonable enquiry and to related proceedings elsewhere, and it is not discharged by exhibiting large volumes of documents and leaving the judge to find the difficulty.8
The consequences of breach are serious, and can seem out of proportion to the significance of what was left out. In Ithmar, the applicant’s affidavit had misdescribed when and how a deposit had been paid, facts which gave the respondent an arguable case that it was entitled to rescind the contract. The Court of Appeal set aside the original orders, explaining that the rule serves in part as a deterrent, although it upheld a fresh order, made once all the facts were before the judge and confined to the UAE.9 In EFG v Marj, Justice Roger Stewart had asked at the without notice hearing whether the draft order was in the standard form and was told that it was. In fact it omitted the usual exception for dealings in the ordinary course of business and departed from the standard provision for fortification, and neither the affidavit nor the skeleton argument contained any section on full and frank disclosure. The judge discharged the order he had himself granted and declined to reimpose it, even though he accepted that he would probably have granted an injunction, on different terms, had the position been fairly put. Permission to appeal was refused.10 The Court has a discretion to continue an order despite a failure of disclosure, but it is exercised sparingly; where the failure is substantial or deliberate, discharge is the starting point, even if the order would still have been made had the matter been disclosed.
The Price of Relief: The Cross-Undertaking and Fortification
Unless the Court orders otherwise, every injunction must contain an undertaking by the applicant to pay any damages the respondent sustains which the Court considers the applicant should pay (RDC 25.25(1)). The Court should also consider whether the undertaking ought to extend to others who may suffer loss as a result of the order (RDC 25.26), such as a bank holding frozen accounts. The undertaking is the counterweight to relief granted before the merits have been tried, and it is the respondent’s main protection if the order later turns out to have been wrongly made.
Where an applicant cannot show sufficient assets within the jurisdiction to give substance to its undertaking, it may be required to reinforce the undertaking with security (RDC 25.25(1)). The Rules give examples: a payment into Court, a bond issued by an insurance company, or a first demand guarantee or standby credit issued by a first-class bank. In an appropriate case, the Court may accept a payment to the applicant’s lawyers to be held by them as officers of the Court, or the undertaking of a parent company.
A company with no assets in the UAE that seeks a freezing order, particularly in support of proceedings abroad, should therefore expect to be asked for fortification and should have it ready, since the order may be made conditional on the security being provided. The sums can be substantial. In Omanand, the applicant argued that no fortification was needed because the award itself was security enough. Justice Stewart required a bank guarantee of USD 5 million all the same, precisely because the respondent’s case that his signatures had been forged meant that he might turn out to be the victim of a fraud. The guarantee was not provided by the date required; the applicant instead paid USD 5 million in cash into the DIFC Courts’ escrow account, which the judge accepted as better security, while declining to declare that the original requirement had been complied with.11 In Larmag, the Dutch applicant paid EUR 350,000 into Court within days of obtaining its injunction in July 2019. The money stood as security through the trial and a later post-judgment freezing order, and was released only in December 2022.12
Security for Costs: The Defendant’s Protection
Where the cross-undertaking protects a respondent against the consequences of an interim order, security for costs protects a defendant against a different risk: that it will successfully defend the claim and then find that the costs order in its favour cannot be enforced. The DIFC Courts apply the rule that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs (RDC 38.7), and a defendant facing a claimant with no assets within reach could otherwise win the case and still be left with a substantial bill.
A defendant may apply for security for its costs of the proceedings (RDC 25.97). The Court may make an order if it is satisfied that it is just to do so having regard to all the circumstances and one of the conditions in RDC 25.102 applies (RDC 25.101). Those conditions are that the claimant is resident out of the UAE; that the claimant is a company or other body and there is reason to believe it will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so; that the claimant has changed address since the claim was commenced with a view to evading the consequences of the litigation; that it failed to give an address, or gave an incorrect one, in the claim form; that it is a nominal claimant unlikely to be able to pay; or that it has taken steps in relation to its assets that would make a costs order difficult to enforce. Security may also be ordered against a non-party who has assigned the claim to the claimant to avoid a costs order, or who has contributed to the claimant’s costs in return for a share of the proceeds (RDC 25.103 and 25.104), which brings third-party funders within reach, and against an appellant on the same grounds as a claimant (RDC 25.105 and 25.106).
Conclusion
An applicant seeking a freezing order or injunction in the DIFC Courts should tie its evidence of a risk of dissipation to what the respondent has actually done with its assets, and its draft order should follow the standard form or explain where it departs from it. The affidavit needs a section on full and frank disclosure, and an applicant with no assets in the UAE should have fortification arranged before the hearing, since the order may be made conditional on it. A respondent served with a without notice order should check how it was obtained, beginning with the draft order and the disclosure section of the affidavit.
This publication does not provide any legal advice and is for information purposes only.
- Larmag Holding BV v First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC and FAB Securities LLC, CFI 030/2019, Amended Order of Justice Sir Richard Field continuing the injunction of 19 July 2019 (issued 18 August 2019, re-issued 26 August 2019), paras 10, 20 and 22. ↩︎
- Ithmar Capital Ltd v 8 Investment Inc and 8 Investment Group FZE [2008] DIFC CA 001 (17 March 2008), paras 1, 25 and 49. ↩︎
- Trafigura Pte Ltd and another v Gupta and another, CFI 040/2025, Order with Reasons of Justice Robert French (9 September 2026), para 278. ↩︎
- Sandra Holding Ltd and another v Al Saleh and others [2023] DIFC CA 003 (6 September 2023), paras 71 and 83; Carmon Reestrutura-Engenharia e Serviços Técnicos Especiais (SU) LDA v Cuenda [2024] DIFC CA 003 (26 November 2024), paras 194, 202 and 204. ↩︎
- Trafigura Pte Ltd and another v Gupta and another [2025] DIFC CA 001 (22 September 2025), paras 9, 18, 132 to 134 and 138. ↩︎
- Omanand v Ondrei, ARB 050/2025, Order with Reasons of Justice Roger Stewart KC (22 January 2026), paras 3, 8, 20 and 25 to 26. ↩︎
- Skatteforvaltningen (Danish Customs and Tax Administration) v FFA Private Bank (Dubai) Ltd, CFI 004/2024, Order with Reasons of Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke (issued 25 July 2024, giving reasons for the decision announced on 23 July 2024), paras 1, 15 to 19, 22 and 23, and para 7 of the Order. ↩︎
- EFG (Middle East) Ltd and another v Marj Holding Ltd and others, CFI 029/2025, Reasons of Justice Roger Stewart for the Order dated 2 June 2025 (issued 27 August 2025), para 15, Trafigura (CFI), para 130, and Omanand, para 42, each adopting the summary of principles in Tugushev v Orlov (No 2) [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm); see also Ithmar, para 34. ↩︎
- Ithmar, paras 32 to 42, 51 and 53. ↩︎
- EFG v Marj, paras 6, 7, 16 to 20 and 23; Order with Reasons of Justice Roger Stewart refusing permission to appeal (11 June 2025), paras 1 and 2. ↩︎
- Omanand, paras 9, 50, 59 and 63. ↩︎
- Larmag Holding BV v First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC and others, CFI 054/2019, Order with Reasons of Justice Sir Richard Field (15 December 2022), Order para 1 and Reasons paras 1 to 3, 6 and 13 to 18. ↩︎