Litigation has a habit of drifting towards trial simply because parties assume that is where defended cases belong. Part 24 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) challenges that assumption. A claim or defence may be pleaded, extensively argued and vigorously maintained. That does not mean it warrants a trial.
Executive summary
RDC Part 24 permits the DIFC Courts to dispose of claims, defences and issues that have no real prospect of success and for which there is no other compelling reason for trial. It is available across all forms of proceedings and may be grounded in law, evidence or both.
The procedural framework is well established. A claimant may not ordinarily apply until an acknowledgment of service or defence has been filed; the application must expressly invoke Part 24; and the respondent must receive at least 14 days’ notice of the hearing and the issues proposed for determination. The Court may also impose conditional orders where success appears possible but improbable.
The DIFC authorities demonstrate a Court willing to use Part 24 robustly where the evidential or legal position justifies summary disposal. Properly deployed, it is not a shortcut around litigation. It is a mechanism for ensuring that only disputes requiring a full trial proceed to one.
Pleaded. Defended. Still dismissed
Commercial litigation still carries an instinctive assumption that once a claim is defended, trial is the natural destination. The Rules take a less sentimental view. A pleading is not a boarding pass to trial.
Under RDC 24.1, the Court may give immediate judgment where a claimant has no real prospect of succeeding, or a defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending, and there is no other compelling reason for the matter to proceed to trial. RDC 24.2 permits the application to be based on a point of law, the evidence expected to be available at trial, or both. RDC 24.3 confirms that the rule is available across all forms of proceedings.
That breadth is significant. Part 24 is not confined to straightforward debt claims or cases turning on clear documentary evidence. It is available wherever the Court can conclude, on the material before it, that a claim, defence or issue lacks sufficient substance to justify the cost, delay and judicial resources associated with a full trial.
The purpose of Part 24 is not to short-circuit genuine disputes. It is to ensure that only genuine disputes proceed to determination.
Real prospect, not theoretical possibility
The language of RDC 24.1 is familiar. Its application is where the real work lies.
A claim or defence does not survive merely because it can be articulated. The question is whether it carries sufficient legal and evidential substance to justify a trial. The Court is not concerned with whether an argument can be advanced, but whether it has a real prospect of succeeding.
The second limb of RDC 24.1 is equally important. The absence of a “compelling reason” for trial is not a refuge for weak cases. It is a safeguard against unfair summary disposal where the Court cannot properly determine the issue on the available material or where the dispute genuinely requires trial-level scrutiny. A party resisting immediate judgment must therefore identify a real issue capable of affecting the outcome. General references to complexity, value or factual sensitivity will rarely suffice.
The enquiry is ultimately practical rather than theoretical. The Court asks whether the claim or defence has a realistic prospect of success and whether there is any genuine reason for the dispute to proceed further.
Merits win cases, procedure wins applications
Part 24 is often discussed in terms of merits. In practice, procedure can be just as important.
The procedural requirements are relatively straightforward but must be observed carefully. A claimant may not ordinarily apply until an acknowledgment of service or defence has been filed. The application must expressly invoke RDC Part 24, identify the basis on which immediate judgment is sought and give the respondent adequate notice of both the hearing and the issues proposed for determination.
These requirements are not technical formalities. They ensure that a party facing summary disposal understands the case it must meet and has a fair opportunity to respond. A strong application can therefore fail if it is procedurally defective, just as a weak application can gain unnecessary traction if procedural requirements are overlooked.
Conditional orders also deserve closer attention than they often receive. Where a claim or defence appears possible but improbable, the Court may require a party to take a specified step, including paying money into Court, as a condition of continuing the litigation. In commercial disputes, such orders can alter settlement dynamics significantly and exert immediate pressure on a party whose position is arguable but weak.
Barclays v Shetty: speculation is not a defence
Barclays Bank PLC v Bavaguthu Raghuram Shetty [2020] DIFC CFI 061 is one of the clearest DIFC authorities on the evidential burden imposed on a party resisting immediate judgment.
The defendant advanced allegations of fraud, regulatory misconduct and matters said to require further investigation. Justice Wayne Martin nevertheless granted immediate judgment, entered judgment in Barclays’ favour, awarded indemnity costs, ordered a substantial payment on account of costs and continued the freezing order in amended terms.
The significance of the decision lies in the Court’s treatment of speculative defences. A party cannot resist immediate judgment by pointing to what future investigations, disclosure exercises or evidential enquiries might reveal. The question is whether there is evidence before the Court capable of supporting a defence with a real prospect of success. In Barclays, there was not.
The later enforcement proceedings in England reinforce the practical significance of the decision. Barclays successfully obtained summary judgment on its enforcement claim in the English Commercial Court. A successful Part 24 application may therefore achieve more than procedural efficiency within the DIFC; it may produce an enforceable judgment capable of relatively straightforward recognition in other common law jurisdictions.
DIFC Investments: complexity is not immunity
In DIFC Investments Ltd v Dubai Islamic Bank [2022] DIFC CFI 024, the Court granted immediate judgment and declared that the claimant had no liability to the defendant bank in respect of sums allegedly due under a construction financing arrangement. The Court also refused permission to amend the defence and counterclaim.
The significance of the decision lies in the nature of the issues before the Court. The dispute involved questions of assignment, contractual interpretation, financing arrangements and the viability of proposed amendments. Having analysed those issues, Justice Cooke concluded that the defendant’s case had no real prospect of success. The decision confirms that Part 24 is capable of determining substantial legal questions where the Court can conclude that the legal foundation of a claim or defence is unsustainable.
The case also demonstrates that amendment is not an automatic escape route from immediate judgment. Where proposed amendments do not cure the underlying deficiencies in a party’s position, the Court may refuse permission to amend and dispose of the claim or defence summarily.
DIFC Investments further illustrates that immediate judgment is not confined to monetary claims. In appropriate cases, declaratory relief may provide the most effective means of resolving a dispute before an asserted entitlement develops into a broader controversy.
Nancy v Narcissa: litigation by elimination
Nancy v Narcissa (CFI 098/2023) demonstrates how RDC 4.16 and RDC 24.1 can operate together to narrow litigation before trial. Justice Michael Black KC held that the claimant’s employment had been validly terminated, struck out certain claims, entered immediate judgment on others and permitted the remainder to proceed.
The significance of the decision lies less in the individual outcomes than in the Court’s procedural approach. Rather than treating the dispute as an all-or-nothing exercise, the Court separated issues that could be determined immediately from those that genuinely required further adjudication. Some claims were struck out as legally unsustainable. Others were disposed of through immediate judgment. Only the balance proceeded further.
Nancy illustrates that strike-out and immediate judgment are complementary case-management tools serving a common objective: ensuring that judicial resources are directed only to issues that genuinely require determination. The decision is a reminder that successful applications do not always end proceedings. Often, their greatest value lies in reducing the scope of what remains.
Two weapons, different targets
Applications under RDC 24 and RDC 4.16 are frequently brought together. Although they often pursue the same commercial objective, they address fundamentally different questions.
A strike-out application assumes the pleaded facts to be true and asks whether the claim or defence is legally sustainable on that footing. An application for immediate judgment goes further. It permits the Court to consider whether the case has a real prospect of success on the available evidence.
The distinction is more than procedural. It determines the scope of the Court’s enquiry, the evidence that may be considered and the burden borne by the applicant. A point that is unsuitable for strike out may nevertheless succeed under Part 24. Equally, a legally defective claim may be struck out without any consideration of the underlying evidence.
Understanding the difference is often critical to the success of the application itself. The question is not simply whether a claim or defence is weak, but why it is weak. That enquiry also shapes the earlier election between RDC Part 7 and Part 8, which determines how much of the evidential record will be available when the application is made.
The best application brought at the wrong time still fails
The availability of Part 24 is often the easy question. Timing is usually the harder one.
An application brought too early may be dismissed as premature. An application brought too late may still succeed, but only after much of its strategic value has been lost. The optimal moment is usually when the parties’ positions have crystallised and the evidential record is sufficiently developed to demonstrate that the dispute does not require trial.
Timing matters in litigation generally. Under Part 24, it can matter as much as the strength of the point being advanced. The same is true of the related question of default judgment, where the moment of application often determines whether the advantage survives a set-aside challenge.
Costs sit firmly within that strategic analysis. Under RDC Part 38, the Court enjoys a broad discretion as to whether costs are payable, in what amount and when. A failed application or a failed resistance to one, can therefore have immediate financial consequences. In commercial litigation, that reality often influences the parties’ positions long before the substantive issues are finally determined.
The Court’s message is clear
The authorities reveal three recurring themes. Barclays confirms that speculation is not a substitute for evidence. DIFC Investments demonstrates that immediate judgment is capable of resolving substantial legal issues, not merely evidential deficiencies. Nancy illustrates how immediate judgment and strike-out may be deployed together to narrow litigation to the issues that genuinely require determination.
Taken together, those decisions show that Part 24 is neither exceptional nor confined to straightforward claims. It is a flexible case-management tool that enables the DIFC Courts to identify and dispose of claims, defences and issues that lack a real prospect of success while preserving those that merit adjudication.
Part 24 does not exist to deny parties their day in Court. It exists to ensure that judicial time, party resources and litigation costs are directed towards disputes that genuinely require determination. Where a claim or defence cannot realistically succeed, the DIFC Courts have repeatedly shown a willingness to say so early, decisively and, where appropriate, expensively.
This publication does not provide any legal advice and is for information purposes only.