The Bill Comes Later: Costs and Part 32 Offers in the DIFC Courts

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Executive summary

The DIFC Courts follow the English rule that the loser pays. A party that wins will ordinarily recover its legal costs from the party that loses, but that is where the simplicity ends. Under Part 38 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”), the Court has a broad discretion over whether costs are payable, how much and when, and it exercises that discretion actively and often at the end of each hearing.

A successful party rarely recovers every dirham it has spent, and recovery is reduced where it has won only part of its case, run applications that should not have been made, charged rates above the benchmark published by the Registry, or simply spent more than the case justified. Conduct, including how seriously each side tried to settle, can push the outcome in either direction, and conduct that is unreasonable to a high degree may attract costs on the indemnity basis.

The most effective tool available to either side is the settlement offer, and a properly made Part 32 offer can shift the burden of costs, attract indemnity costs and enhanced interest, and change the commercial calculation of the dispute. An offer that misses the formal requirements loses most of that force, as a recent decision illustrates.

The General Rule and Its Limits

RDC 38.7 states the starting point: the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, but the Court may make a different order. In deciding what order to make, the Court must have regard to all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, and any admissible offer to settle (RDC 38.8). Conduct is defined broadly. It covers conduct before as well as during the proceedings, whether it was reasonable to raise or contest a particular issue, the manner in which a case was pursued or defended, and whether a successful claimant exaggerated its claim (RDC 38.9).

The amount is then assessed on either the standard or the indemnity basis (RDC 38.17). On the standard basis, only proportionate costs are allowed and any doubt about reasonableness is resolved in favour of the paying party (RDC 38.18); on the indemnity basis, proportionality falls away and doubt is resolved in favour of the receiving party (RDC 38.19). Either way, costs unreasonably incurred or unreasonable in amount will not be allowed.

Costs are also dealt with as the case goes along: where a hearing lasts no more than a day, the general rule is that the Court assesses costs there and then (RDC 38.30), and they must be paid within 14 days (RDC 38.40). Where costs are sent for detailed assessment, Practice Direction No. 5 of 2014 provides that the Court will ordinarily order half of the amount claimed to be paid on account in the meantime. A party that loses an interlocutory skirmish will usually feel it within a fortnight.

Partial Success: Counting the Wins

Commercial disputes are rarely won on every point, and RDC 38.10 allows the Court to award a proportion of a party’s costs, costs from or until a certain date, or the costs of a distinct part of the proceedings. Where it would otherwise make an order for the costs of particular issues, the Court must, if practicable, award a proportion instead (RDC 38.11). The reason is practical. In Al Khorafi v Bank Sarasin-Alpen, Sir John Chadwick declined to make an issue-based order because the evidence was largely common to the claims that succeeded and those that failed, and unpicking it would have cost more than it was worth; he discounted the claimants’ costs by 10% against one defendant and 20% against the other.1

In ASW Hospitality AG v MAG Of Life FZ-LLC, a more recent example, the claimant recovered about AED 1.9 million, far less than it had claimed, and lost on most of the principal issues, although it was plainly the successful party. Sir Peter Gross saw no attraction in “becoming embroiled in an Issue by Issue analysis” and awarded it 40% of its costs, describing that as the order reflecting the overall justice of the case.2 In BAM Higgs & Hill LLC v Affan Innovative Structures LLC, the subcontractor defeated the claim entirely but recovered substantially less than it had pleaded on its own counterclaim for variations, and Justice Michael Black reduced its recovery to 85%.3 In Wincore Advisory Group DMCC v JPV Management Consultancy, the Court held that the claimant’s costs “should reflect its partial, rather than complete, success”, where part of its claim had been dismissed and the rest reduced.4

The discount is not automatic, and a party that has won the substance of a heavy dispute will not lose part of its costs merely because it failed on a point or two. In LXT Real Estate Broker LLC v SIR Real Estate LLC Justice Andrew Moran ordered the defendant to pay the whole of the claimant’s costs of a strike-out application that had failed on all but one of its many grounds, observing that it “came to the hearing, it fought, it lost (almost completely) and it should pay in full”.5 The lesson for clients is to choose their battles. Each additional head of claim or defence carries its own risk as to costs, and a party that pleads every conceivable point and loses half of them should expect to see that reflected in what it recovers.

Unnecessary Applications and Unnecessary Experts

The Court looks at how a party reached the result as well as at the result itself, and interlocutory applications brought to delay, to repeat an earlier application or simply to apply pressure are an obvious target. In Denisova v Galtcev, Justice Sapna Jhangiani found that a second application to exclude the defendants’ witness evidence largely repeated a first application that had already been dismissed, and was therefore unnecessary. That finding, together with the inclusion of costs that did not belong to the issue being assessed, led her to reduce the claimant’s costs from about USD 76,600 to USD 50,000.6

Expert evidence attracts the same scrutiny, since it must be restricted to what is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings (RDC 31.12), it requires the Court’s permission (RDC 31.13), and the Court may limit the expert fees recoverable from the other side (RDC 31.18). Practice Direction No. 5 of 2014 contemplates indemnity costs for parts of a case that caused unnecessary expense, giving reliance on deficient expert evidence as an example. A party that adds claims requiring specialist evidence should therefore ask early whether those claims justify the expense, since if they fail its own expert’s fees may be irrecoverable and the other side’s payable. Conversely, where experts help to narrow the issues in dispute and assist the Court in resolving them efficiently, their fees will generally be recoverable. In BAM Higgs, Justice Black rejected an attack on the successful party’s quantum expert, noting that agreement between experts on a “figures as figures” basis assists the Court and reduces costs.7

Lawyers’ Fees: The Registry’s Benchmark

Clients are often surprised that the Court will reduce a winning party’s legal fees even where those fees were agreed and paid. On assessment, the Court asks what it is reasonable to pass on to the losing party, which is a different question from what the client agreed to pay. To answer it, the Court has a benchmark, namely Registrar’s Direction No. 1 of 2023. Issued on 9 June 2023 and replacing the 2017 direction, it sets out average hourly rates drawn from a survey of law firms in Dubai.

Although the rates are only guidance, the Court regularly assesses costs against them.

Beyond the rates, the Court looks at who did the work and whether the time spent was proportionate (RDC 38.23), and work done by a more senior lawyer than necessary, duplicated across fee earners or spent on unnecessary steps will be trimmed.

Proportionality is not a matter of simple arithmetic, since the relationship between the costs and the value of the claim may not be a reliable guide, and in a modest claim the costs may equal or even exceed the amount in dispute (RDC 38.24 and 38.25).

Conduct and Indemnity Costs

Indemnity costs are reserved for cases that fall outside the norm. Practice Direction No. 5 of 2014 identifies the kinds of case in which they will be considered: deliberate misconduct in breach of a direction of the Court or unreasonable conduct to a high degree, inappropriate conduct in a wider sense before or during the litigation, and abuse of process. Such orders are normally a mark of the Court’s disapproval of the paying party’s conduct.

In Vision Investment and Holdings Ltd v Mahdi Amjad, Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke ordered indemnity costs where the claim had been “contrived”, brought by the wrong party, preceded by a misrepresentation about an earlier decision of the Dubai Courts, and pursued for sums that had already been struck out.8 In BAM Higgs, the claimant had suppressed a key document and the terms of its settlement with the employer, and Justice Black held that its conduct was unreasonable to a high degree and “goes well beyond the merely wrong or misguided in hindsight”, ordering both defendants’ costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis.9

Conduct for these purposes includes efforts to settle, and the Court must consider the efforts made, before and during the proceedings, to resolve the dispute (RDC 38.23(1)(b)), and Practice Direction No. 5 of 2014 allows it to take into account how the parties approached mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. In Wincore, the limited efforts made before proceedings to narrow or resolve the dispute were among the factors that reduced the successful claimant’s recovery.

Part 32 Offers: Making Settlement Count

RDC Part 32 provides a formal mechanism for settlement, closely modelled on Part 36 of the English Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”), with defined consequences for costs. Either party may make a Part 32 offer at any time, including before proceedings have begun (RDC 32.8). To qualify, the offer must be in writing; state on its face that it is intended to have the consequences of Part 32; specify a period of not less than 21 days within which the defendant will be liable for the claimant’s costs if the offer is accepted; state whether it relates to the whole of the claim, part of it or a particular issue; and state whether it takes into account any counterclaim (RDC 32.4). A defendant’s offer to pay money must be an offer of a single sum (RDC 32.15).

Where a claimant fails to obtain a judgment more advantageous than a defendant’s offer, the defendant will, unless the Court considers it unjust, be entitled to its costs from the end of the relevant period, with interest on those costs (RDC 32.50). Where a claimant obtains a judgment at least as advantageous as its own offer, the Court will, unless it considers it unjust, award the claimant its costs on the indemnity basis from the end of the relevant period, together with interest on the judgment sum and on those costs at up to 10% above Base Rate (RDC 32.51). In deciding whether that would be unjust, the Court looks at the terms of the offer, when it was made, the information then available, and whether either party withheld information needed to make or evaluate it (RDC 32.52).

For a claimant, that combination is powerful: a defendant that rejects a reasonable offer and fights on risks paying costs it can no longer challenge on proportionality, together with enhanced interest, from the date the offer expired. For a defendant, a well-pitched offer shifts the risk of continuing onto the claimant. Timing matters, since the enhanced consequences do not apply to an offer made less than 21 days before trial unless the Court has abridged the relevant period (RDC 32.54).

Form Matters: The Kitopi Warning

The consequences of Part 32 attach only to offers that comply with RDC 32.4 (RDC 32.2), and Kitopi Catering Services LLC v Mons Hospitality FZE shows what is at stake. The claimant’s offer letter, sent in September 2024, was headed “Part 36 Offer”, stated that it was intended to be a Part 36 offer and ended by saying that it was intended to have the consequences set out in Part 36 of the CPR. The defendant rejected it, saying among other things that it was not a valid offer because DIFC procedural rules applied. Justice Roger Stewart KC accepted that the Court will try to construe offers as valid Part 32 offers where it properly can, but held that this letter, read as a whole, purported to be an offer under the English rules and could not be treated as one under Part 32. The claimant could easily have reissued it in compliant form and had not done so.10

The claimant had offered to accept roughly half of its pleaded debt and went on to obtain judgment for considerably more, and the judge said that, but for the defect, he would have found that it had beaten its offer and would have awarded additional interest on the principal and on costs at 5% above Base Rate. That benefit was lost. The letter still counted as a without prejudice save as to costs offer, and the judge indicated that the defendant’s failure to accept it would have justified indemnity costs had he ordered a detailed assessment, but the automatic consequences of Part 32 fell away, and he allowed nothing for the substantial costs incurred after judgment in arguing the point.11 For parties familiar with English procedure, the moral is a simple one: offers in the DIFC Courts should be made under the DIFC Rules.

Costs as Strategy

Costs are best treated as part of litigation strategy from the first letter. A client should expect less than full recovery even if it wins, and should budget on that basis. It should plead selectively, because every additional claim, defence or expert carries its own risk as to costs and partial success is reflected in a reduced percentage, and it should think carefully before issuing interlocutory applications, which are paid for quickly and, if they fail, paid for twice. Fees that exceed the Registry’s benchmark need justification, and accurate time records, sensible staffing and proper delegation make recovery much easier to defend.

Above all, a party should make a proper Part 32 offer, and make it early. An offer that complies with RDC 32.4 in form as well as substance, pitched realistically and made once the key information is available and well before trial, remains one of the most effective ways both to bring pressure to bear and to protect against the costs of a case that does not go to plan. The final order will reflect how much of the case a party won, how it was conducted, what it spent and whether it gave its opponent a fair opportunity to settle, and the parties who recover best are usually those who kept all four in mind from the outset.

This publication does not provide any legal advice and is for information purposes only.

  1. Al Khorafi and others v Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Ltd and another, CFI 026/2009, Order of Deputy Chief Justice Sir John Chadwick made on 28 October 2014 (issued 30 October 2014), Reasons paras 13 and 14. ↩︎
  2. ASW Hospitality AG v MAG Of Life FZ-LLC, CFI 077/2022, Order with Reasons of Justice Sir Peter Gross (2 April 2025), paras 6, 9, 11, 12 and 16. ↩︎
  3. BAM Higgs & Hill LLC v Affan Innovative Structures LLC and another, CFI 106/2021, Order with Reasons of Justice Michael Black (30 June 2026), paras 114 to 117. ↩︎
  4. Wincore Advisory Group DMCC v JPV Management Consultancy and another, CFI 054/2024, Order with Reasons of Deputy Chief Justice Ali Al Madhani (24 February 2026), paras 2, 4, 6 and 7. ↩︎
  5. LXT Real Estate Broker LLC v SIR Real Estate LLC, CFI 073/2024, Order with Reasons of Justice Andrew Moran (13 February 2026), paras 4 and 5. ↩︎
  6. Denisova v Galtcev and another, CFI 041/2024, Order with Reasons of Justice Sapna Jhangiani (26 May 2025), paras 1, 12 and 15 to 17. ↩︎
  7. BAM Higgs, paras 50 and 111. ↩︎
  8. Vision Investment and Holdings Ltd v Mahdi Amjad, CFI 053/2022, Order with Reasons of Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke (30 May 2025), para 4. ↩︎
  9. BAM Higgs, paras 122 to 124 and 127. ↩︎
  10. Kitopi Catering Services LLC v Mons Hospitality FZE, CFI 081/2024, Order with Reasons of Justice Roger Stewart KC (30 April 2026), paras 6, 7 and 10. ↩︎
  11. Kitopi, paras 3, 6(c), 11, 13, 17 and 21. ↩︎